fix(webhook): remediate SSRF vulnerability in webhook dispatcher

- Add plugin/webhook/validate.go as single source of truth for SSRF
  protection: reserved CIDR list parsed once at init(), isReservedIP(),
  and exported ValidateURL() used at registration/update time
- Replace unguarded http.Client in webhook.go with safeClient whose
  Transport uses a custom DialContext that re-resolves hostnames at
  dial time, defeating DNS rebinding attacks
- Call webhook.ValidateURL() in CreateUserWebhook and both
  UpdateUserWebhook paths to reject non-http/https schemes and
  reserved/private IP targets before persisting
- Strip internal service response body from non-2xx error log messages
  to prevent data leakage via application logs
This commit is contained in:
Steven 2026-02-23 10:14:24 +08:00
parent f43965de00
commit 150371d211
3 changed files with 125 additions and 8 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package webhook
import (
"net"
"net/url"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
)
// reservedCIDRs lists IP ranges that must never be targeted by outbound webhook requests.
// Covers loopback, RFC-1918 private, link-local (including cloud IMDS at 169.254.169.254),
// and their IPv6 equivalents.
var reservedCIDRs = []string{
"127.0.0.0/8", // IPv4 loopback
"10.0.0.0/8", // RFC-1918 class A
"172.16.0.0/12", // RFC-1918 class B
"192.168.0.0/16", // RFC-1918 class C
"169.254.0.0/16", // Link-local / cloud IMDS
"::1/128", // IPv6 loopback
"fc00::/7", // IPv6 unique local
"fe80::/10", // IPv6 link-local
}
// reservedNetworks is the parsed form of reservedCIDRs, built once at startup.
var reservedNetworks []*net.IPNet
func init() {
for _, cidr := range reservedCIDRs {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
if err != nil {
panic("webhook: invalid reserved CIDR " + cidr + ": " + err.Error())
}
reservedNetworks = append(reservedNetworks, network)
}
}
// isReservedIP reports whether ip falls within any reserved/private range.
func isReservedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range reservedNetworks {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ValidateURL checks that rawURL:
// 1. Parses as a valid absolute URL.
// 2. Uses the http or https scheme.
// 3. Does not resolve to a reserved/private IP address.
//
// It returns a gRPC InvalidArgument status error so callers can return it directly.
func ValidateURL(rawURL string) error {
u, err := url.ParseRequestURI(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid webhook URL: %v", err)
}
if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "webhook URL must use http or https scheme, got %q", u.Scheme)
}
ips, err := net.LookupHost(u.Hostname())
if err != nil {
return status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "webhook URL hostname could not be resolved: %v", err)
}
for _, ipStr := range ips {
ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if ip != nil && isReservedIP(ip) {
return status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "webhook URL must not resolve to a reserved or private IP address")
}
}
return nil
}

View File

@ -2,9 +2,11 @@ package webhook
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"time"
@ -16,8 +18,40 @@ import (
var (
// timeout is the timeout for webhook request. Default to 30 seconds.
timeout = 30 * time.Second
// safeClient is the shared HTTP client used for all webhook dispatches.
// Its Transport guards against SSRF by blocking connections to reserved/private
// IP addresses at dial time, which also defeats DNS rebinding attacks.
safeClient = &http.Client{
Timeout: timeout,
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: safeDialContext,
},
}
)
// safeDialContext is a net.Dialer.DialContext replacement that resolves the target
// hostname and rejects any address that falls within a reserved/private IP range.
func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Errorf("webhook: invalid address %q", addr)
}
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "webhook: failed to resolve host %q", host)
}
for _, ipStr := range ips {
if ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr); ip != nil && isReservedIP(ip) {
return nil, errors.Errorf("webhook: connection to reserved/private IP address is not allowed")
}
}
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(host, port))
}
type WebhookRequestPayload struct {
// The target URL for the webhook request.
URL string `json:"url"`
@ -42,10 +76,7 @@ func Post(requestPayload *WebhookRequestPayload) error {
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: timeout,
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
resp, err := safeClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to post webhook to %s", requestPayload.URL)
}
@ -57,7 +88,7 @@ func Post(requestPayload *WebhookRequestPayload) error {
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode > 299 {
return errors.Errorf("failed to post webhook %s, status code: %d, response body: %s", requestPayload.URL, resp.StatusCode, b)
return errors.Errorf("failed to post webhook %s, status code: %d", requestPayload.URL, resp.StatusCode)
}
response := &struct {
@ -80,7 +111,6 @@ func Post(requestPayload *WebhookRequestPayload) error {
func PostAsync(requestPayload *WebhookRequestPayload) {
go func() {
if err := Post(requestPayload); err != nil {
// Since we're in a goroutine, we can only log the error
slog.Warn("Failed to dispatch webhook asynchronously",
slog.String("url", requestPayload.URL),
slog.String("activityType", requestPayload.ActivityType),

View File

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"github.com/usememos/memos/internal/base"
"github.com/usememos/memos/internal/util"
"github.com/usememos/memos/plugin/webhook"
v1pb "github.com/usememos/memos/proto/gen/api/v1"
storepb "github.com/usememos/memos/proto/gen/store"
"github.com/usememos/memos/server/auth"
@ -729,6 +730,9 @@ func (s *APIV1Service) CreateUserWebhook(ctx context.Context, request *v1pb.Crea
if request.Webhook.Url == "" {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "webhook URL is required")
}
if err := webhook.ValidateURL(strings.TrimSpace(request.Webhook.Url)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
webhookID := generateUserWebhookID()
webhook := &storepb.WebhooksUserSetting_Webhook{
@ -797,7 +801,11 @@ func (s *APIV1Service) UpdateUserWebhook(ctx context.Context, request *v1pb.Upda
switch path {
case "url":
if request.Webhook.Url != "" {
updatedWebhook.Url = strings.TrimSpace(request.Webhook.Url)
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(request.Webhook.Url)
if err := webhook.ValidateURL(trimmed); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
updatedWebhook.Url = trimmed
}
case "display_name":
updatedWebhook.Title = request.Webhook.DisplayName
@ -808,7 +816,11 @@ func (s *APIV1Service) UpdateUserWebhook(ctx context.Context, request *v1pb.Upda
} else {
// If no update mask is provided, update all fields
if request.Webhook.Url != "" {
updatedWebhook.Url = strings.TrimSpace(request.Webhook.Url)
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(request.Webhook.Url)
if err := webhook.ValidateURL(trimmed); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
updatedWebhook.Url = trimmed
}
updatedWebhook.Title = request.Webhook.DisplayName
}